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I. Introduction
Over the last thirty years, both the federal government and a
majority of states have enacted statutes that prohibit certain types of
conduct involving illicit drugs in or near schools, school buses, or other
youth or family-related facilities and locales.' These statutes vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction in terms of whether they stand alone as
separate offenses or serve as a sentencing enhancement and in terms of
the defenses available. The net effect of such statutes in either case is to
"hypercriminalize" certain areas or spaces where drug activity takes
place by increasing the length of incarceration after conviction. Such
statutes have been subject to a number of challenges over the years.
Chief among them are constitutional claims that such statutes are an
invalid exercise of legislative or police power,2 violate due process and
equal protection guarantees,3  violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the crime,
4
violate double jeopardy provisions, 5 or are overbroad.6  A number of
other claims have been based upon the allegedly vague and arbitrary
nature of statutes that punish persons who were found with drugs in their
vehicles while passing through school zones7 . A third set of claims point
to the lack of a requirement that the offender intended to be present in the
* Assistant Professor Cleveland State University Law School, A.B. Princeton
University, J.D. University of California, Los Angeles. I am grateful for comments on
earlier drafts received from participants in the 2001 American Society of Criminology
Annual Meeting and from Professors April Cherry and Patricia Falk. I also thank
participants in the 2003 Cleveland Marshall Faculty Luncheon fbrum and Holli Goodman
for her superb secretarial assistance.
I. See, e.g. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 856, 860 (1994), Aiz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-609, 13-
3408 (2001), CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11353.6 (2001), GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-
32.4 (2001), IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-4-6 (2001); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D
(2001).
2. See, e.g., State v. Hermann, 164 Wis. 2d 269 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Burch, 545 So. 2d 279 (Fla. App. D4 1989).
3. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 791 So. 2d 1064 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (due process
claim based on lack of fair notice); State v. Brown, 648 So. 2d 872 (La 1995.); State v.
Ward, 92 Ohio App. 3d 631 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (equal protection claims).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 146 F.3d 25, 30 (Ist Cir. 1998);,State v.
Hermann, 474 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); Philips v. State, 578 So. 2d 40; (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) State v. Burch, 545 So. 2d 279 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959); ; State v.
Brown, 547 A.2d 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1988); United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d
1215, 1220-22 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
5. See, e.g., Riley v. South Carolina, 82 F. Supp. 2d 474 (D.S.C. 2000), State v.
Otto, 717 A.2d 775 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998), State v. Dillihay, 601 A.2d 1149 (N.J. 1992).
6. See, e.g., State v. Strong, 875 P.2d 166 (Ct. App. 1993).
7. People v. Townsend, 62 Cal. App. 4th 1390, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 124 Ed.
Law Rep. 965 (6th Dist. 1998), State v Patrick (1996) 42 Conn App 640, 681 A2d 380.
Jackson v State (1990, Ala App) 570 So 2d 874
Drug Free School Zones
drug-prohibited zone.8 To date, virtually none of these challenges have
succeeded, and both federal and state schoolyard statutes are widely
hailed as major weaponry in the war against drugs.9
In this article, I discuss these frequent challenges to schoolyard
statutes in order to set the stage for what is a far more provocative and as
yet unaddressed aspect of schoolyard statutes: the role of
"hypercriminalization" of spaces. This article looks at schoolyard
statutes and considers the problem of hypercriminalization of spaces as it
affects two aspects of the statute. The first is the problem of persons
possessing prohibited substances whose presence in the prohibited zone
is due to luck or happenstance. Although there has been al uncanny
degree of uniformity throughout courts' decisions to uphold schoolyard
statutes against a wide variety of challenges, a review of the cases
involving happenstance or fortuitous presence in school zones suggests
that courts may, under particular circumstances, be unwilling to find
liability for presence in the zone which is so fleeting, tangential, or
fortuitous that there would be manifest injustice were the statute to be
applied.10 The second aspect of hypercriminalization which this article
addresses is a less frequently litigated aspect of schoolyard statutes:
liability for drug possession in or near school buses and public housing
projects. Schoolyard statutes routinely extend liability to such areas.
The question which grows out of this added liability for drug activity
near schools or near other areas is whether justice and the goal of a drug-
free America"l clearly demand the creation of this hypercriminalized
space and the consequent lengthened incarceration in such cases.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Falu, 776 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985).
9. This success might be seen as the triumph of the war on drugs. See infra
footnote II.
10. See generally Andrew Little, Comment, Caught Red-Handed: The
Peculiarities Of The Federal Schoolyard Statute And Its Interpretation In The Fifth
Circuit, 31 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 345 (2000); Sonja R. West, Comment, "Possessing
With Intent To Distribute" Under The Schoolyard Statute, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1399
(1997); Russell D. Hall, Note, United States . Wake: Fifth Circuit Hands Down Hard-
Line Intent Requirement In Schoolyard Statute, 10 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 443 (1993);
Shara Beth Mervis, Note, Constitutional Law-Maryland's Drug-Free School Zone
Statute, Which Increases Penalties for Distribution of Controlled Dangerous Substances
Within 1000 Feet of School Property, Satisfies Due Process Requirements, 24 U. BALT.
L. REV. 385 (1993).
1I. It is sometimes said that the ultimate goal of the "war on drugs" is a "drug
free" America. Much research suggests, however, that at this point in our history such a
goal is quixotic and cannot be realized, or perhaps, will not be realized as long as
Americans remain ambivalent about whether drug use represents a legitimate moral
scourge. As Thomas Szasz argues in his book JUST AND UNJUST WARS: THE WAR ON THE
WAR ON DRUGS-SOME MORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE WAR ON
DRUGS AND OUR RIGHT TO DRUGS: THE CASE FOR A FREE MARKET, (1992) Americans are
in thrall to a system of therapeutic and pharmacological paternalism in which "bad drugs"
and "street drugs" are much maligned as the cause of societal ills, while drugs prescribed
by doctors, regardless of whether such drugs truly alleviate any particular illness or
2003]
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The first section of this article discusses the nature of criminalized
and hypercriminalized spaces in general, and drug-free school zones as
hypercriminalized spaces. The second section details the creation of
federal schoolyard statutes and recurring challenges to their validity.
The third section discusses congressional power to act in the area of drug
interdiction. Section Four considers Equal Protection and Due Process
claims arising from presence in schoolyard zones. Section Five
examines several mens rea challenges to schoolyard statutes. The sixth
section looks at Eighth Amendment challenges to school zone statutes.
In section seven, I describe liability arising from proximity to school
buses and housing projects and how hypercriminalization effectively
"deperimeterizes" some locales. Finally, the article concludes with a
discussion of how the various points under discussion in this paper relate
to the notion of the hypercriminalization as a method of crime control.
1I. Criminalized Spaces in General and Drug Free Zones--The
Hypercriminalized Space
In this Section, 1 set forth my theory of hypercriminalized space by
first describing and discussing the notion of criminalized space. Both are
important to understanding the nature and function of drug free zones.
A. Criminalized Space
The general goal of criminal laws is to condemn certain immoral
12
or bad acts causing harm to society.13 Thus, when we speak of criminal
condition, are sacrosanct. Id. at 47-48. The result, says Szasz, is that the political elite
have access to drugs through their "physician-suppliers" while others are denied access.
Id. at 97. An early example of this is seen in the first federal drug control law, the
Harrison Act, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 4701-4706 (1964))
(repealed 1970). The Harrison Act required importers, producers, and distributors of
opium and cocaine to register and pay an occupation tax. Only "legitimate" persons
could register and obtain the required transfer forms to buy or sell the drugs. 26 U.S.C.
§§ 34701 & 34703. The Harrison Act addressed primarily opiates and cocaine, and
removed distribution of these substances from the hands of the public and placed
distribution in the hands of physicians and pharmacists. Id.
12. Joel Fineberg HARMLESS WRONGDOING 4 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 10-17 (1988) (the "harm principle" while related to morality and the
notion of evil, is distinct from it. "The harm principle is, obviously, a kind of moralistic
principle, aimed at determining the moral values that may properly be enforced by the
morality-shaping apparatus of the criminal law. But it still does not follow that the harm
principle permits the criminal law to proscribe any and all kinds of wrongdoing, or any
and all kinds of evil." There are, as Fineberg writes, an entire class of wrongs which,
while imputable to human beings, do not give rise to personal grievances.)
13. Note that harm alone is generally not seen as a sufficient as a basis for
criminalizing an offense. The "harm" principle has been explicated at length by a
number of commentators. See, e.g. Douglas N. lusak, The Nature And Justifiability Of
Drug Free School Zones
prohibitions, we generally speak of particular acts that are to be
condemned because of their harmful effect on others. It is often the case,
however, that we condemn certain acts not simply because of the
inherent wrongfulness of the act, but because of where the act takes
place. The nature of the place thus adds to the harmfulness of the act.
We criminalize not just the act but also the space in which it occurs;
usually on the rationale that certain acts in certain places represent
societal wrongs. I have termed statutes of this nature "criminalized-
space" statutes.
The notion of criminalized space applies generally to prohibitions
on acts in certain public places. The concept does not apply in the same
way to certain private spaces because, as in the example of burglary laws
or criminal trespass, the prohibitions on entry are founded upon ideals of
security in private property and not so much upon the notion that the
public is personally harmed when these crimes occur.14 Some examples
of criminalized public spaces and behavior include: no parking zones,
maximum speed zones, illegal parking, juvenile curfew laws,
15
jaywalking,' 6  public drunkenness, 7  public profanity, 18 loitering, 19
vagrancy, 20 sleeping in outdoor public areas, 21 camping or storage of
Nonconsummate Offenses, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 151, 155-158 (1995). At least one
commentator has, however, suggested that the harm principle has become the sole
justification basis for determining whether to criminalize particular acts. "Claims of
harm have become so pervasive that the harm principle has become meaningless: the
harm principle no longer serves the function of a critical principle because non-trivial
harm arguments permeate the debate. Today, the issue is no longer whether a moral
offense causes harm, but rather what type and what amount of harms the challenged
conduct causes, and how the harms compare." Bernard E. Harcourt, Criminal Law: The
Collapse Of The Harm Principle 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 113 (1999).
14. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 223 (1769).
15. See, e.g., Hodgkins v. Peterson, 175 F.Supp. 2d 1132 (S.D. Ind. 2000);
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Qutb v. Bartlett, II
F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993); People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55 (111. 1976).
16. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 727 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 2000).
17. See, e.g., Maynard v. Conmonwealth, 261 S.W. 10 (1924); Laboon v. State,
67 S.E. 2d 149 (1951); Berry v. Springdale, 381 S.W.2d 745 (Ark. 1964).
18. See, e.g., Brendle v. City of Houston, 177 F. Supp. 2d 553 (N.D. Miss. 2001);
Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442 (5th Cir. 1984); Clay v. Wainwright, 470 F.2d 478
(5th Cir. 1972); Finn v. United States, 256 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1958).
19. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (holding a loitering law
unconstitutionally vague). See also United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868 (4th Cir.)
(upholding regulation barring loitering on government property). Modern loitering
statutes avoid the charge of vagueness by more narrowly tailoring the statutes as to the
time and place of prohibitions. See also Paul Ades, Comment, The Unconstitutionality of
"Antihomeless" Laws: Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a
Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CAL. L. REV. 595, 604-05 (1989).
20. Vagrancy, meaning the presence or wandering in public by idle persons, has
long been a part of Anglo-American jurisprudence. See, e.g. Harry Simon, Towns
Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive
Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 636-41 (1992) (exploring
the history of English and American vagrancy laws); Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and its
2003]
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goods in public places, 22 sitting or lying in public,23 public urination and
defecation, 24 public nudity, 25 public indecency, 26 littering, graffiti,
begging or panhandling,27 soliciting employment in public, 8 and no
smoking areas. 29  There are occasional "emergency safety zones"prohibiting presence in a particular area designated by police officials. 30
Administration, 104 PA. L. REV. 603. 609 & n.7 (1956). In Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), the Supreme Court found such statutes
unconstitutional.
21. See, e.g. Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd
and vacated for lack of standing, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995) (ordinance prohibiting
sleeping in public is unconstitutional); People v. Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 10
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1985) (ordinance prohibiting sleeping at certain times in
certain places is constitutional); Pollard v. State, 687 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
(complaint alleging violation of ordinance prohibiting sleeping and dozing in public void
for failure to include culpable mental state); Seeley v. State, 655 P.2d 803 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) (ordinance prohibiting lying, sleeping or sitting in public right-of-ways meets
constitutional scrutiny); State v. Penley, 276 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(affirming a motion to suppress granted when a gun was found on a sleeping man roused
by police for violating no sleeping ordinance).
22. 'robe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1160-66 (Cal. 1995) (the Supreme
Court of California upheld the validity of a city ordinance that banned camping and
storage of personal property in public areas. The court rejected allegations that the
ordinance violated the right to travel, constituted status criminality, and was void for
vagueness.) See also Portland v. Johnson, 651 P.2d 1384 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
23. Berkeley Cnty. Health Project v. City of Berkeley, 902 F. Supp. 1084 (N.D.
Cal.1995) (upholding a preliminary injunction of a statute which prohibited sitting or
lying in public.).
24. See, e.g., Littleton v. Detroit, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16428 (E.D. Mich.
2002); Vigue v. State, 987 P.2d 204 (Ala. 1999).
25. See, e.g., Colonial First Prop., LLC v. Henrico County, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1070
(E.D. Va. 2001).
26. See, e.g., Armengau v. Cline, 7 Fed. App.. 336 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
27. Begging and panhandling statutes have long been part of Anglo American
law. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 749 F. Supp. 341, 353-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), in which the court considers the history of begging in England and the United
States: See also Robert Teir, Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public Spaces: A
Constitutional Approach to Aggressive Begging 54 LA. L. REV. 285 (1993) (beggars
divided into different classes and prescribing different terms of incarceration, ranging
from six months to two years, for each. Begging or panhandling statutes often have
specific provision about where such activity may not occur. See, e.g., Baltimore,
Md., Code art. 19, 249(d).
28. See, e.g., Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Burke, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16520.
29. U.S. v. Roberts, 735 F. Supp. 537, 541 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Nonsmoking
laws raise an interesting question because smoking is viewed as a minor vice that is the
subject of the criminal law only when users behave so as to subject others in public
places to secondhand smoke. This is true even though smoking is one of the most
harmful substances available in the legitimate marketplace, causing thousands of deaths
and serious illnesses annually. As the court in U.S. v Roberts stated in reference to the
illogic of imposing stringent penalties for possessing drugs with intent to distribute in
school zones:
[Vol. 8:1
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The vast majority of criminalized space offenses may be subsumed under
the heading of "Quality of Life Violations" in that the violation of such
ordinances is seen as an assault upon accepted standards of decency or
propriety that are the foundation of a high quality life style.3' Residents
of all neighborhoods, rich or poor, should ideally be in favor of such
laws, since, according to one commentator, laws addressing the quality
of life in neighborhoods help to shape information about the beliefs and
intentions of society about crime. - Those who wish to deter crime
should concern themselves less about the effect of certain policies on the
price of crime and more about the message conveyed by such policies.33
It is argued that absence of such laws may result in disorder, and disorder
may be "pregnant with meaning," 4 sending signals not only about the
individual law breaker, but about a community's ability or willingness to
enforce certain norms of behavior.3 5  This may be true regardless of
whether such acts are in fact minor infractions. Scholar Jane Jacobs has
posited that without access to safe and crime-free streets, a city becomes
subject to a number of other ills.3  Neighborhoods which fall prey to
Whereas distribution relates to supply and manufacturing implies both a
foothold or some establishment leading to the supply of drugs within the
vicinity of the school, possessing, while passing through the zone, with
intent to deliver elsewhere, does nothing to adulterate the zone with a
supply of drugs than a smoker having an unopened pack of cigarettes does
to adulterate a nonsmoker section or zone.
30. Leonardson v. East Lansing, 896 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding
an ordinance that allowed the chief of police or his designate to create
"emergency safety zones").
31. See, e.g., Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(in which the City of San Francisco initiated a program to rigorously enforce laws against
the homeless in order to address citizen complaints. In terming such offenses "Quality of
Life" offenses, the city described them as being aimed at "a "type of behavior [that) tends
to make San Francisco a less desirable place in which to live, work or visit"). Id. at 845.
See also Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997).
32. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349, 351 (1997)
33. Id.
34. Id. at 370.
35. Id. at 371.
36. Jane Jacobs, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961). Jacobs
writes:
The bedrock attribute of a successful city district is that a person must feel
personally safe and secure on the street among all these strangers. He must
not feel automatically menaced by them. A city district that fails in this
respect also does badly in other ways and lays up for itsell, and for its city
at large, mountain on mountain of trouble.
20031
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public lawlessness become susceptible to negative characterizations.
37
To combat such lawlessness, it becomes important to legislate behavior
in public spaces to a degree which eliminates crime yet maintains vital
freedoms. Robert C. Ellickson has argued that what is called for is more
policing by officers with "significant discretion in enforcing general
standards against disorderly conduct and public nuisances "8 in keeping
with community norrns,or, in some circumstances, a system of formal
city zoning of public spaces which strictly limits undesireable activities
to certain areas, similar in some respects to the skid rows or "red light"
districts of the past.39
Not withstanding such efforts at regulating public spaces
ostensibly for the public good, it has been argued that, though such
statutes are seemingly neutral and enforcement is part of the "order
mnaintenance" 4  or "community care-taking ' 41  function of law
enforcement, there is much potential for abuse of police discretion
because of the lack of specificity in many such ordinances4 2 Moreover,
37. Wesley G. Skogan, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF
DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (1990). Skogan writes that "visible physical and
social disruption is a signal that the mechanisms by which healthy neighborhoods
maintain themselves have broken down. If an area loses its capacity to solve even
seemingly minor problems, its character becomes suspect." Id. at 48.
38. Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 Yale L.J. 1165, 1245 (1996).
39. Id. at 1244-1247. See also Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551,
1582 (S.D. Fla. 1992), where the court proposes that the city of Miami, Florida might
avoid constitutional problems by providing an area where homeless persons could
lawfully be present; McElroy v. Fort Lauderdale, No. 94-6266 (filed Mar. 30, 1994),
(S.D. Fla. 1994); Maria Foscarinis. Downward Spiral: Honielessness and Its
Criminalization, 14 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. I, 61 (1996).
Ellickson envisions a colored-coded zoning system consisting of three codes, red,
green and yellow. The codes would be of of varying stringency in governing street
behavior. A city's public spaces would be assigned to a zone paired with just one of these
colors, with Red indicating "extreme caution to the ordinary pedestrian; Yellow, some
caution; and Green, a promise of relative safety." Ellickson adds that "It must be
stressed that these color codes are chosen with an eye to pedestrians of ordinary tastes,
not to those inclined to engage in nuisance behavior. This usage is consistent with the
phrase "Red Light District," which connotes disorderliness to an ordinary citizen, but not
necessarily to a brothel patron." Id. at 1220-21.
40. See Livingston, supra note 3 1, at 581-84.
41. See e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S 364, 368, 371 n.5 (1976); Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973). Here, community care-taking refers to the
general function of law enforcement to act to ensure the peace, safety, and health of the
public. Note that the "community care-taking" function is one of the exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
42. Id. Note that another school of thought finds that the rigorous enforcement of
such statutes leads to a more crime free society. This "Broken Windows" theory asserts
that forceful policing of minor offenses will result in reducing more serious crimes in the
same way that repairing broken windows in buildings helps to avoid more serious
property damage. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 35: see also Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting On
Drug Free School Zones
because order maintenance policing implicitly relies upon the
enforcement of a mainstream social norm, communities of persons who
are outside of the mainstream such as racial minorities may be branded
as "presumptively lawless" by tile imposition of such norms.4 3 Finally,
laws which promote a high quality of life offer us an antiseptic model of
living, where public interactions are carefully monitored and almost
scripted so that the average "good citizen" avoids one aspect of what has
been called "the tragedy of the common"-the possibility of messy or
unpleasant social interactions because some persons will overuse public
spaces to the detriment of others.44 It has been argued that such minor
unpleasantness is an important part of social vitality and thus these
impulses towards to utopia should be checked.45
Criminalized space offenses are, in fact, most often found among
the minor violations of various criminal codes and thus subject violators
to relatively minor penalties. One explanation for the relatively minor
penalties resulting from violation of criminalized space statutes is that
the activities that are typically prohibited under such laws are, for the
most part, otherwise legal. One noteworthy exception to the typically
minor penalties assessed in criminalized space statutes is the Gun Free
School Zones Act of 1990,46 which makes it a federal crime to
knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone. "School zone" is defined
as in, or on tile grounds of, a public, parochial, or private school or
within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of such a school.47
Although under many circumstances gun possession is perfectly legal,
this statute calls for heightened criminal penalties for gun possession in
or near schools. 48  Because possession of many types of guns is
otherwise legal, the statute allows for numerous exceptions that would
permit possession of a firearm in a school zone.49  While these
The Subject: A Critique Of The Social Influence Conception Of Deterrence, The Broken
Windows Theory, And Order-Maintenance Policing, New York Style. 97 MICH. L. REV.
291 (1998).
43. Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, And The Social Meaning Of
Order-Maintenance Policing 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 779 (1999). See
also Stephen R. Munzer, Ellickson On "Chronic Misconduct" In Urban Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Bench Squatters, And Day Laborers, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. I, 15-
16(1997).
44. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243-48 (1968),
reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 132, 133 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds.,
1995).
45. Allan B. Jacobs, GREAT STREETS 4, 8-9 (1993). Jacobs suggests that
although public areas like streets should be safe, the streets should also function as areas
for social interactions that are not always pleasant.
46. 18 U.S.C § 922 (2002)
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 18 U.S.C § 922 (q)(2)(B) (2002) provides for the following exceptions:
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exceptions do make allowances for the sometimes legal nature of gun
possession, courts have made clear that portions of § 922 which
criminalize gull possession do not otherwise violate the Second
Amendment right to bear arms because that right is not an individual
right but a collective one; applying to the right of the state to maintain a
militia.50 This has been the position of other federal circuits considering
the question as well.5' Nonetheless, to demand penalties for activities
which would be legal in other locales seems to violate a fundamental
notion of liberty.
5 2
Another thing which these "criminalized space" statutes have in
common is that most can be described as examples of nonconsummate
crimes. Nonconsummate crimes are those that do not cause harm each
(B) Subparagraph (A) does not apply to the possession of a firearm--
(i) onl private property not part of school grounds-
(ii) if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do so by the State in
which the school zone is located or a political subdivision of the State, and the law of the
State or political subdivision requires that, before an individual obtains such a license, the
law enforcement authorities of the State or political subdivision verify that the individual
is qualified under law to receive the license;
(iii) that is--
(1) not loaded; and
(11) in a locked container, or a locked firearms rack that is on a motor
vehicle:
(iv) by an individual for use in a program approved by a school in the school
zone;
(v) by an individual in accordance with a contract entered into between a school
in the school zone and the individual or an employer of the individual;
(vi) by a law enforcement officer acting in his or her ofticial capacity; or
(vii) that is unloaded and is possessed by an individual while traversing school
premises for the purpose of gaining access to public or private lands open to hunting, if
the entry on school premises is authorized by school authorities.49 United States v.
Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 401-02 (6th Cir. 2000)
51. See United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305 (11 th Cir. 2000); Gillespie v.
City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 709 (7th Cir. 1999): Fraternal Order of Police v.
United States, 173 F.3d 898, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the militia service of all
police officers, only of domestic violence misdemeanants whose convictions have not
been expunged"); United States v. Waller, 218 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2000) ("it is now
well-settled that Congress did not violate the Second Amendment" in enacting 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(I)), United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Mack, 164 F.3d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Three Winchester
30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288, 1290 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974) ; Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34
(8th Cir. 1972) ( § 922(a)(6) does not violate the Second Amendment)
52. See, e.g. Berkeley Cmty. Health Project v. City of Berkeley, 902 F. Supp.
1084, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (enjoining enforcement of California ban on begging near
ATMs because "solicitation of donations is a form of speech, protected under both the
federal and state constitutions"). This has, in fact been the basis of a number of
challenges to the "Quality of Life" ordinances-that they are vague and overbroad,
violate equal protection, or infringe on the other liberties such as freedom of speech or
assembly.
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time that they are committed. 53 According to Douglas Husak, drug
crimes would fall into the category of nonconsumInmate crimes, 54 and
would moreover be "simple" nonconsummate crimes. As Professor
HLusak points out however, it may be possible to conceive of drug crimes
as consummate, that is, causing harm each time such crimes are
committed." While it is possible to view drug crimes in this way, it is
nonetheless, "implausible." 56 Because this would require a belief that the
existence of elicit drugs in our society is in itself a grave harm or moral
wrong. While such a belief is often at the heart of drug prohibitions, it is
not clear that such a premise bears scrutiny in light of the many other
harmful substances that are possessed or distributed legitimately, such as
cigarettes and alcohol.
Nonconsummate crimes are not to be confused with inchoate
crimes. Inchoate crimes are incomplete crimes such as attempt or
conspiracy. In the case of inchoate crimes, the criminal actor engages in
a series of activities towards a particular criminal goal, but somehow
falls short of the goal.57 Though inchoate crimes may be seen as a
subcategory of nonconsummate crimes, 58 nonconsummate crimes are
more broadly cast, because they encompass all crimes that cause risk of
harm rather than actually causing harm. 59 Criminalized space cases,
however, do raise the fundamental question seen in the discussion of
other nonconsummate crime cases: whether such sweeping government
regulation is justified when the harm is not always realized.
Both federal and state schoolyard statutes take to high art form the
notion of criminalizing spaces. Indeed, the ambit of federal and state
schoolyard statutes usually includes both public and private spaces, as
the creation of perimeters around schools or other facilities does not
make allowances for activities which occur in private homes and some
provisions criminalize certain drug activities around publicly funded
housing projects. Nonetheless, in the case of schoolyard statutes, the
argument cannot as easily be made that such prohibitions violate some
53. Douglas N. Husak, The Nature And Justifiability Of Nonconsumimate
Offtnses, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 151, need pinpoint cite (1995):
[A]n offense is consummate if the conduct it proscribes causes harm on
each occasion on which it is performed. The paradigm, "core" examples of
crimes in any jurisdiction, Anglo-American or otherwise, satisfy this
description. But not all crimes are consummate. Some offenses proscribe
conduct that does not cause harm on each occasion in which it is
performed. Such offenses might be called nonconsummate.
54. Id. at 178.
55. Id. at 179.
56. Id.
57. See Joshua Dressier, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (2 ed. 1995) 347-48.
58. Id. at 166-67; see also Husak, supra note 44 at 166.
59. Hlusak, supra note 44, at 165.
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fundamental liberty interest, for in almost no instance is the distribution
or even the possession with intent to distribute illicit narcotics legal in
any space.
Note that the concept of criminalizing space thus contrasts sharply
with the effort by some municipalities to control illicit drug activity by
excluding persons convicted of certain drug offenses from certain areas
based on the higher incidence of drug-related crimes in those areas. In
Johnson v. City of Cincinnati,60 a municipal ordinance excluded
individuals for up to ninety days from the "public streets, sidewalks, and
other public ways" in all drug-exclusion zones if the individual is
arrested or taken into custody within any drug-exclusion zone for one of
several enumerated drug offenses.61  The ordinance extended the
exclusion for a year if the individual was convicted of the drug offense.
Variances could be granted by the chief of police for persons who, prior
to the drug arrest, resided in, were employed in, or owned a business in
the drug exclusion zone.62 Variances could also be granted by or by
social services agencies for reasons relating to the health, welfare, or
well-being of the person excluded or for drug abuse-related counseling
services.63 The variance was rendered void if the holder violated its
terms or was subsequently arrested for a drug offense.64
Because the ordinance barred excluded individuals from each and
every public space and roadway in the designated areas, the Federal
Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court in striking down the
ordinance as an impermissible burden on the right to intrastate travel.
However, the court left open the possibility that a more narrowly tailored
version of the ordinance that was supported by a clearer record, could
withstand strict scrutiny. The court clearly sympathized with Cincinnati
authorities who drafted the ordinance: "Temporary exclusion is an
extreme measure, but we recognize that municipalities like the City of
Cincinnati face formidable challenges in improving the safety and well-
being of its citizens in high crimes areas. 6 5
If, in an effort to protect the right to access public spaces; or the
sanctity of private homes, we were to posit that illicit drug activity be
prohibited only in certain places, it would derogate from the very nature
of our existing drug laws. Indeed, one might argue that permitting drug
distribution, possession or use in even limited spaces is an act which is
rife with the potential for creating more societal problems than it cured,
60. 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir 2002)




65. Id at 506
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if the example of those countries which have experimented with
decriminalizing drug use in certain areas is at all instructive.6"
B. Hypercriminalized Spaces
Because schoolyard statutes call for heightened penalties over and
above those for committing an act outside the designated zone, it can be
said that schoolyard statutes hypercriminalize certain spaces. In
addition, schoolyard statutes, hypercriminalization is seen in the example
of increased penalties for possessing guns in school zones, 67 and
speeding in construction zones.68 To account for the loss of liberty from
criminalized space, even in the case of schoolyard drug cases, imposing
such penalties should significantly reduce the harm of the illicit activity
in the stated areas. To date, however, it is not at all clear that such
hypercriminalization significantly reduces the incidences of the
prohibited activityin those designated areas.69
Hypercriminalization is not to be confused with the concept of
overcriminalization which has been discussed in criminal law literature.70
Overcriminalization has been described as improperly applying criminal
sanctions to "morally neutral" conduct."'71 Of course, one must define
just what comprises "morally neutral" conduct. It may simply be that
moral neutrality is found somewhere in the nebulous middle ground of
the classic distinction between mala in se and mala prohibitum crimes.
66. Consider, for example, the experience of the Netherlands where drug use was
allowed in certain zones. See, e.g, Eric Thomas Berkman, Sacrificed Sovereignty?:
Dutch Soft Drug Policy in the Spectre of Europe without Borders, 19 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 173 (1996). See also Henk van Vliet, The Uneasy
Decriminalization: A Perspective on Dutch Drug Policy, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
717 (1990).
67. 18 U.S.C. 922(q) (West 2002).
68. See, e.g. MISS. CODEANN. § 63-3-516 (2001); CODE OF ALA. § 32-5A-176.1
(2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 291C-104 (2001); (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 265:6-a (2002);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-153 (2001); UTAii CODE ANN. § 41-6-13 (2001). (Note,
however, that many cases involving speeding in construction zones may differ in one
significant way from schoolyard drug cases and cases involving guns in school zones:
statutes that heighten penalties for speeding in construction zones often limit increased
penalties to those times when construction workers are actually present in the zone.) But
see Col. Rev. Stat. 42-4-614 (2001) (workers need not be present as long as construction
zone signs placed within four hours of time work will be taking place); Mo. Rev. Stat. §
304.580 (2001).
69. See e.g., Ethan A. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States, Costs,
Consequences, and Alternatives, 245 SCI. 939 (1989).
70. See e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374
ANNALS 157 (1967).
71. Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533,
1535 (1997).
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Mala in se describes those crimes which are wrong in and of themselves;
mala prohibilum are those crimes which typically are not wrongful in
themselves, but are, for various reasons related to health, safety, or
welfare, deemed criminal by legislators). 72 It has been lamented that
overcriminalization leads, for example, to a narrowing of the gap
between tort and crime, so much so that crime loses its stigma.
73
Nevertheless, a number of violations which could be characterized
as criminalized space cases could equally be considered as examples of
overcrim inalization. Consider the matter of jaywalking. Jaywalking
criminalizes crossing the street in areas not designated for pedestrian
crossing, or crossing in designated areas at times when such crossing is
not permitted. 74 Walking, or walking across streets, is of course morally
neutral conduct so much so that jaywalking is paramount among those
crimes to which virtually no stigma attaches. It is in fact frequently
referenced as an example of a minor crime.
5
Thus, we have the drug free school zones existing not only as
examples of criminalized space cases but also as a clear example of
hypercriminalization. If viewed as part of the same trend as other
criminalized space offenses, then we could see drug free school zone
laws as merely additional tools in creating and maintaining a "high
quality lifestyle." The more typical criminalized space offense results,
however, in the imposition of a relatively minor penalty. This cannot be
said of drug free school zone cases. A facile justification for this is that
neither illicit drug possession with intent to distribute, actual distribution,
nor illicit drug manufacturing are legal under virtually any circumstance,
and so significant penalties should be applied for violations. But here it
becomes necessary to unpack what is intended by deeming such offenses
72. See e.g., Morrissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 269 (1952)
73. See II. PACKER, Ti IE LiMITs Or TIlE CRIMINAL SANCTION 249-364 (1968);
Sanford Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions To Enforce
Economic Regulations, 30 U. CI. L. REv. 423 (1963); Henry Hart, The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONrEMP. PROBs., Winter 1958, at 401, 431.
74. See e.g., Cal. Veh. Code § § 21954, 21955 (Deering 2003); NY CLS Veh
& Tr § 1152 (NY Consolidated Law Service 2002), S.D. Codified Laws § 32-27-4
(2002).
75. See, e.g. Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 709 (Ct., year) (references the
spectrum of crime "from murder and mayhem to joyriding and jaywalking"); Jaywalking
is the paradigm "trivial" crime. See also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Herman, 131 F.3d 666, 668
(1997) ("Trivial violations deserve trivial fines, but the Secretary [of Labor] is entitled to
insist on some exaction even for the equivalent of jaywal king"); Deibler v. Rehoboth
Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 337 (1986) ("sewer assessments, parking fines, dog law violations,
jaywalking and other minor infractions"); United States v. Mills, 472 F. 2d 123 1, 1239
(1971) ("A huge proportion of the public is guilty of some sort of petty infraction almost
every day -jaywalking, exceeding the 25-mph limit, using high beams, parking in a
loading zone, among many others."); Brinson v. Florida. 273 F. Supp. 840, 845 ( S.D.
Fla. 1967)(" Such a construction could lead to the appointment ofcounsel for
misdemeanors not normally considered criminal, such as overparking and other petty
traffic offenses, jaywalking, dropping trash upon the sidewalk, and like offenses").
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criminal. Is it, that such behavior is immoral or evil? Or is it that here
are instances where we focus on the harms caused by such behavior? If
it is the latter, then we run Lip against the problem of nonconsummate
crimes detailed above. If it is the former, then we risk upsetting the drug
prohibition applecart by challenging whether in fact such drug offenses
can rightfully be viewed as immoral or evil since such terms are
reflections of society's values and thus frequently subject to revision. In
either case, it would seem clear that the hypercriminalized space created
by drug free school zones is not an effective weapon in the arsenal of the
war oii drugs.
III. The Creation of the Federal Schoolyard Drug Statutes and
Recurring Challenges to Validity
Nothwithstanding what appears to be the dubious success of other
anti-drug strategies, the federal schoolyard statute is yet another facet of
the war on drugs. It is just one of many types of federal penalty
enhancement provisions.7 6 Like many others, it is based on the notion
that penalty enhancement and corresponding incarceration will
ultimately reduce crime." The creation of such penalties is only one way
in which the so-called "war on drugs" has been waged in this country.7 8
76. See, e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(1-2) enhancement provisions for employing a
person under the age of 18 in a the commission of a drug offense; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
provides for additional consecutive five year terms for offenders who carry firearms in
the commission of certain crimes, the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)
provides for an enhanced penalty of a mandatory lifteen-year minimum for those persons
who have three qualifying prior violent felony convictions, the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he]
knows.., is a school zone," 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(I)(A). Note that in United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause does not
provide Congress the authority to prohibit the possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of
a public school. The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, however, mandates that states pass
legislation requiring local education agencies to expel from school for at least a year
students possessing weapons in school. Exceptions are allowed on a case-by-case basis.
77. See generally Rudolph J. Gerber, On Dispensing Justice, 43 Ariz. L. Rev.
135 (2001); Susan N. Hermann, Measuring Culpability By Measuring Drugs? Three
Reasons To Reevaluate The Rockefeller Drug Laws, 63 ALB. L. REV. 777 (2000); Tracey
L. Meares, Social Organization And Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191
(1998).
78. The "war onl drugs" is conducted chiefly through the White House Office
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), a part of the Executive Office of the
President. The ONDCP is headed by a director or "drug czar" as he is more popularly
known. This office was established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. "The principal
purpose of ONDCP is to establish policies, priorities, and objectives for the Nation's drug
control program. The goals of the program are to reduce illicit drug use, manufacturing,
trafficking, drug-related crime and violence, and drug-related health consequences. To
achieve these goals, the Director of ONDCP is charged with producing the National Drug
Control Strategy. The Strategy directs the Nation's anti-drug efforts and establishes a
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The federal schoolyard statute was the model for most subsequent
state schoolyard statutes. It was created in its earliest form as part of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (commonly
known as the Controlled Substances Act) of 1970.79  The statute
prohibits the "distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or
manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or within one thousand
feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary,
vocational, or secondary school or a public or private college, junior
college, or university, or a playground, or housing facility owned by a
public housing authority, or within 100 feet of a public or private youth
center, public swimming pool, or video arcade facility."80 Section 841(a)
of the Act sets forth the substantive drug offenses under judicial law, and
prohibits the manufacture, distribution, dispensation, or possession with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance, 81 as
well as the creation, distribution, dispensation, or possession with intent
to distribute or dispense a counterfeit substance. 2 Section 856 prohibits
knowingly opening or maintaining any place for the purpose of
manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance, as well as
managing or controlling any building, room, or enclosure, either as an
owner, lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and
intentionally renting, leasing, or making available for use, with or
without compensation, the building, room, or enclosure for the purpose
of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled
83substance.
There was, and still is, much disagreement as to whether such
penalty enhancements can significantly decrease crime. 84  At least one
program, a budget, and guidelines for cooperation among Federal, State, and local
entities." See About ONDCP-Office of National Drug Control Policy Enabling at
http://www.whitchousedrugpolicy.gov/about/legislationhtmil. The Budget
recommendation for the ONDCP for fiscal year 2002 is estimated at $19.2 billion, an
increase of $1.1 billion over the 2001 fiscal year budget of $18.1 billion. Id. For further
discussion of the "War on Drugs" and the initiatives developed to combat the growth of
drug trafficking and use, see generally Congressman Bob Barr, Eric Sterling, and Juan
Williams, Debate: The War on Drugs: Fighting Crimes or Wasting Time, 38 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 1537 (2001); Debate: Mandatory Minimums In Drug Sentencing: A Valuable
Weapon In The War On Drugs Or A Handcuff On Judicial Discretion? 36 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1279 (1999); Mathea Falco, Toward a More Effective Drug Policy, U Chi Legal F 9
(1994); Diane-Michele Krasnow, To Stop the Scourge: The Supreme Court's Approach to
the War on Drugs, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 219, 220 (1992); Charles Rangel, Our National
Drug Policy, I STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 43, (1989).
79. 21 U.S.C.A. § 880 (2003)
80. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841,856, and 860 (2003)
81. 21 U.S.C § 841(a)(1).
82. 21 U.S.C § 841(a)(2).
83. 21 U.S.C § 856(a-b).
84. Some have suggested, lbr example, that the war on drugs has done little to
end the pandemic of drug use in some low income urban areas. One of the clear results
of United States drug policy is an increase the population of.jails, while there is no clear
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commentator has adopted a metaphor of drug dependency in suggesting
that the reliance on increased incarceration to reduce drug-related crime
is nothing less than an obsession which has morphed into a societal
"incarceration addiction." 85  Another commentator has assailed
heightened criminal penalties for drug involvement as part of the
"supply-side seduction" of such policies, a reference to the commonly
held belief that drug use can be eliminated by focusing on suppliers both
foreign and domestic.86 Others, however, have found clear rationales for
the increase in incarceration as a crime preventative.
87
correlation between such increases and the reduction of drug crime or use. See, e.g.,
Doug Bandow, War On Drugs Or War On America, 3 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 242, 244-
45 (1991); see also Rangel, supra note 7lat 51-52. This is true notwithstanding the fact
that federal drug offenders on the average serve more time than those convicted of sexual
abuse, assault, manslaughter, burglary, and arson. Scott K. Peterson, Comment, The
Punishment Need Not Fit The Crime: Harmelin v. Michigan And The Eighth Amendment,
20 PEPP. L. REV. 747 (1993).
85. Margaret P. Spencer, The Sentencing Controversy: Punishment And Policy In
The War Against Drugs, Sentencing Drug Offenders The Incarceration Addiction, 40
VILL. L. REV. 335, 339 (1995) The author terms the dependency on increased
incarceration to solve the problem of crime an addiction because there is, she argues, no
rationale for such dependence.
86. Falco, supra note 71 at 10-1 I. In a growing trend, however, courts and social
services have come to see that a focus on the demand-side of the drug trade may be
equally as effective in combating drug use. Thus, courts are increasingly looking to
treatment alternatives to sentencing in minor drug cases. See, e.g. Pamela L. Simmons,
Comment, Solving the Nation's Drug Problem: Drug Courts Signal a Move Toward
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 35 GONz. L. REV. 237 (2000).
87. See, e.g. Theodore Caplow and Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison
Policy And Population Trends, 26 CRIME & JUSTICE 63, 64, (1999), where the authors
cite several authorities for the proposition that increased incarceration has, at the very
least, a specific deterrent effect upon those criminals who are incarcerated. Id. However,
the authors also point to the fact that political opportunism and efforts to cope with
changes in economic, racial and gender hierarchies could equally as well be a factor
major factors in the growth of incarceration, as such societal changes recall to some
commentators nineteenth century fears of the rise of the "dangerous classes". Id. at 65-
66. This is particularly true as we look at the history of drug prohibition in the United
States. As one commentator has written of the early twentieth century and drug
prohibition:
[Tjhe notion that using cocaine would heighten the desire of black men to
rape white women was widely proclaimed. The same was held to be true
with regard to the use of opium by Chinese men. Fears of "hopped up
Negroes" and "opium smoking Chinamen" fueled anti-drug sentiment,
especially in the South and West. Despite the fact that, at the time, the
majority of addicts were actually those white housewives hooked on
patent medicines, the alleged threat to "our women," viewed as poor
innocents, was used to heighten moral outrage over intoxication.
Lynne M. Paltrow, The War On Drugs And The War On Abortion: Some Initial Thoughts
On The Connections, Intersections And The Effects, 28 S.U. L. REV. 201, 207 (2001).
See also See Ronald Hamoway, ILLICIT DRUGS AND GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH
DRUGS: CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL 9 (Ronald Hamoway ed. 1987) in
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The federal schoolyard statute was enacted its original form in 1984.88 It
provided for an enhanced penalty for the distribution of drugs within
1,000 feet of a school. 89 The 1984 statute, introduced by Senator Paula
Hawkins of Florida,90 was intended to reduce the presence of drugs in the
schools by threatening those who distributed drugs near schools drugs
with heavy penalties.9 In 1986, the statute was amended to prohibit both
manufacturing and distributing within 1,000 feet of a school. 92 The 1986
amendment also broadened the scope of educational institutions where
such penalties applied.93 A particular concern of the drafters of the 1986
amendments was the threat of crack cocaine near schools. 94 In 1988, the
statute again underwent changes, this time to prohibit possession with
intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. 95  The impetus of
Congress seems to have again been the fear of having large quantities of
drugs near schools.
96
IV. Congressional Power to Legislate in the Area of Drug Interdiction
One of the chief concerns in assessing the federal schoolyard
statute is whether in fact Congress has the power to act in this area. The
schoolyard statute is in the nature of a police power measure: that is, it
acts to protect the health, morals, and welfare of persons. Such powers
are presumably left to the states via the Tenth Amendment. 97 Those
concerns which are "traditionally local" should not, ideally, be the
subject of federal legislation based upon the Commerce Clause. Yet
many, if not most, federal criminal laws and sanctions seemingly affect
such local concerns. The Supreme Court has, nonetheless, sustained the
validity of such criminal laws, relying chiefly upon an "affecting
commerce" rationale applied increasingly in police power situations such
which the author discusses the ready availability of opiates and cocaine via legal sources
such as mail order and general stores. One of the earliest laws to outlaw such substances
was an 1875 San Francisco law aimed at Chinese opium dens, which outlawed the use of
opiates.
88. 21 U.S.C. § 845(a) (1984).
89. Id.
90. Elected to the Senate in 1980, she was the first woman to be elected to the
United States Senate without a husband or father preceding her. Paula Hawkins was one
of the frontline warriors in the war on drugs. In her memorable final campaign for the
Senate, she ran Miami Vice style ads featuring "sirens and gun-wielding police." Michael
Hedges, "A Decade of Drugs," WASH. TIMES, December 28, 1989, at B8.
91. 130 CONG. REC. S559 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1984).
92. 132 CONG. REC. HI219at§ 1104(1986).
93. Id.
94. 132 CONG. REC. S10426 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1986).
95. 134 CONG. REC. S 15785-01 at §. 2254 (1988).
96. 134 CONG. REC. S 17360 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988).
97. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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as modern criminal legislation.98 This was seen in the case of United
States v. Thornton,99 in which the court observed that the basic federal
drug statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), was a constitutional exercise of the
federal legislative power to regulate interstate commerce even when the
distribution is entirely intrastate. The test there was whether such
activities had an affect on interstate commerce and drug trafficking,
whether within one state or between states. 00
Such a challenge to a Congressional exercise of power in all area
involving police power has, nonetheless, been successfully raised. This
was the case in US. v. Lopez,10° where the Supreme Court struck down a
criminal conviction under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as
beyond congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. Because
the Schoolyard Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 845a (now 21 U.S.C. § 860) is al
enhancement of 841(a) and it would seem that it should be equally
vulnerable to such an attack. In US. v. Rodgers,10 2 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals also confronted such a challenge. There the defendant
argued that Lopez stood for the proposition that Congress could not
impose a penalty for drug activity that affects minors or takes place near
schools. The Court, however, rejected this argument, finding that the
Supreme Court's holding in Lopez did not apply where the subject of the
prohibition was drugs instead of guns.'03 Drug dealing, said the Rogers
court, is an economic activity that affects interstate commerce, and
"courts have uniformly upheld regulation of drugs near schools.' 0 4
Although this is offered as a means of distinguishing guns from drugs,
the distinction is not terribly persuasive. While guns may certainly be
said to effect interstate commerce, so, too, do drugs. Such drug-related
commerce clause claims have in fact failed in every circuit which has
addressed them.
10 5
98. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), concerning the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, which made it illegal to engage in "extortionate credit
transactions" better known as loan-sharking. The Supreme Court upheld the statute
against a Commerce Clause challenge although the transaction had occurred entirely
within one state. Id.
99. 901 F.2d 738 (Cal Ct. App. 1990).
100. Id.
101. See generally U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
102. 89 F.3d 1326, 1338 (7th Cir. 1996).
103. Id.
104. Id at 1338.
105. See United States v. Zorrilla, 93 F.3d 7, 8-9 (Ist Cir. 1996); United States v.
Clark, 67 F.3d 1154, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135,
1139-41 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1338 (7th Cir. 1996); see
also, United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568, 569-72 (D. Kan. 1995); United
States v. Lopez, 2 F. 3d 1342, 1366 n.50 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 514 U.S. 549, (1995)
(noting the differences between 18 U.S.C.§ 922(q), the Gun-Free School Zones Act, and
21 U.S.C. § 860, the Schoolyard Statute). United States v. Baucum, 66 F.3d 362 (DC Cir.
1995), reh'g denied, 80 F.3d 539 (DC Cir. 1996). In Baucum, defendant sought to raise a
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V. Due Process, Equal Protection, and Presence in Schoolyard Zones
The schoolyard statute has been tile subject of numerous claims
invoking due process and equal protection provisions of both federal and
state constitutions. One series of cases attacks the decision to prosecute
such cases in federal as opposed to state court when there is dual
jurisdiction. Because the federal schoolyard statute operates as a penalty
enhancement and not as a separate offense, it is sometimes the case that
federal prosecutors may choose to charge an offense under only Section
841(a) and not the auxiliary Section 860. The exercise of such discretion
has itself been the basis of constitutional challenge, as it has been argued
that this level of discretion violates a defendant's due process rights.
10 6
Because most states now have analogous schoolyard statutes
incorporated into their own criminal codes, federal authorities may defer
to state prosecutions under certain circumstances.10 7 Given the fact that
Commerce Clause objection upon post conviction appeal, urging it as a jurisdictional
matter which could not be waived. The court, however, did not reach the merits of the
defendant's claim because the issue was not raised in a timely fashion in proceedings
below. Id.
106. United States v. Pitts, 908 F2d 458, (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
107. Although the Attorney General's Manual (U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATrORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-27.000 to 9-27.7501 ) lists several factors to be considered in
making the decision as to whether to bring a federal case where there is concurrent state
jurisdiction, such matters are entirely discretionary. The manual indicates, for example,
that "[a] United States attorney may modify or depart from the principles set forth herein
as necessary in the interests of fair and effective law enforcement within the district." Id.
at § 9-27.140. Such jurisdictional decisions are typically unreviewable. See, e.g., United
States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1514 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Smith, 30 F.3d
568, 572 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. lacobs, 4 F.3d 603, 604-05 (8th Cir. 1993);
See also Ellen A. Peters, State-Federal Judicial Relationships: A Report From the
Trenches, 78 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1891 (1992); see generally Tobin J. Romero,
Prosecutorial Discretion, 83 GEO. L.J. (1995). An interesting example of choosing
between state and federal prosecutorial forums is the "Federal Day" sweep tactics used
from 1983 to 1989 by federal officials in New York under former United States Attorney
Rudolph Giuliani. Under this program, relatively minor crimes which would typically be
prosecuted by state authorities were prosecuted by federal authorities. See, e.g. United
States. v. Agilar, 779 F. 2d 123, 125 2nd Cir. 1985). Thought the court in Agilar upheld
the validity of the "Federal Day" sweep, it was clearly critical of the program:
Though we are urged in other contexts to tolerate missed deadlines
because of the enormous burdens placed upon limited numbers of federal
law enforcement personnel. on "federal day" there are apparently enough
federal prosecutors available with sufficient time to devote to $30 drug
cases that have been developed solely by state law enforcement officers.
Be that as it may, the case is lawfully within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts and must be decided."
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conviction of a federal crime may subject defendants to harsher penalties
in some instances,' °8 the decision to pursue either a state or federal
prosecution also been the subject of challenges.1
0 9
The schoolyard statute has also been the subject of due process
claims. One series of cases argues that the statute violates due process
because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that any sale of drugs
within the statutorily defined range should be subject to an enhanced
penalty." 10
Other cases have raised due process claims based upon the fact that
no mens rea as to knowledge of the distance from the school is
required."' Still other claims have raised equal protection challenges,
typically of two varieties: over-or underinclusiveness, or various types of
discrimination."12 A number of the claims of over-or underinclusiveness
have routinely raised the fact that the original statute and some of its
See also United States v. Aiello, 589 F. Supp 740, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). A national
"Federal Day" was at one time proposed. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief:
The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1137-45 (1995).
108. See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define
the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 979, 982 (1995);
Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66
S. CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1993) (exploring some of the civil liberties implications of the
"war on drugs"); Robert Eldridge Underhill, Sentence Entrapment: A Casualty of the War
on Crime, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 165 (1994).
109. An act which is a crime under both state and federal laws may be prosecuted
in either state or federal court. There are, nonetheless, "certain due process restrictions to
a prosecutor's discretion in selecting a forum." United States v. White, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17781 (CT. 1990) "Specifically, when a prosecutor selects one forum over
another simply to ensure a harsher sentence upon conviction, then there is a violation of
the defendant's right to due process." Id. Despite these precedents, success for
defendants in such selective prosecution cases is relatively rare, even where the
challengers assert that the government has acted to violate due process or equal
protection because of the selective nature of the prosecution. United States v. Oakes;
United States v. Cyprian, 23 F.3d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir.)("To obtain an evidentiary hearing
[on a selective prosecution claim], the factual basis for these claims must be more than
colorable. In other words, a defendant must proffer 'sufficient evidence to raise a
reasonable doubt that the government acted properly in seeking the indictment."')
110. See, e.g. United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123 (2nd Cir. 1985); United
States v. Nieves,608 F.Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Dixon, 619 F.Supp.
1399 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. White 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17781; ; United
States v. Crew, 916 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d 66 (6th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Thornton , 901 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1990).
Il1. See, e.g. United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123 (2nd Cir. 1985); United
States v. Cunningham,615 F.Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Cross, ) 900
F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Haynes, 881 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1989); United
States v Pitts, 908 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v Holland, 810 F.2d 1215
(U.S. App. D.C. 1987).
112. Most of the claims have asserted disparate impact on urban residents in
densely populated urban areas, or racial minorities who live disproportionately in urban
areas. Courts have, however, rejected such claims. See, e.g. United States v. Agilar, 779
F.2d 123 (2nd Cir. 1985); United States v. Nieves, 608 F.Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
United States v. Dixon, 619 F.Supp. 1399 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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subsequent amendments only focused on school areas, when in fact
children faced drug perils in other non school places which they
frequented, faced drug perils outside of the 1,000 foot range, and
arguably did not face drug perils when, for example, only adults were
involved in private residences and when school was not in session."' As
some commentators have argued, such drug legislation effectively
becomes a policy "fig leaf," which covers the seamy underside of urban
decay and neglect, as "drug problems" become the scapegoat for societal
ills which policy makers cannot or will not address through more
narrowly tailored legislation.' 4 Many of the equal protection and due
process claims are based upon cases which I have termed "fortuitous
presence" or "happenstance" cases, in that they involve persons who
were present in or lived in areas which were termed drug free school
zones.
Several cases at both the federal and state level, which raise equal
protection or substantive due process claims, involve defendants who
argue that their living conditions are such that they cannot reasonably
live outside of a drug prohibited zone. Their presence is, to a great
degree, merely happenstance. Thus, they argue, they are treated
differently than persons who are able to live elsewhere. For example, in
United States v. While, 115 the defendant raised substantive due process
and equal protection claims based upon a portion of an indictment
charging him with violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 845a. This statute
provides for sentence enhancement for a conviction of narcotics
distribution within 1,000 feet of a school. The alleged narcotics
distribution took place in the city of New Haven, Connecticut, where
almost all the city falls within the protected 1,000 foot school zone. The
defendant argued that the existence of such widespread prohibited zones
failed to comport with the intent of the legislation, which was to create
drug free zones around schools in particular. The court disagreed with
the defendant, finding that application of the statute met with legislative
intent, and that there was no reason to "carve out an exception" for New
Haven even given its numerous schools throughout the city.
113. See. e.g. United States v. Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1988); United
States v. Crew 916 F.2d 980 (5tth Cir. 1990); United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d 66 (6tth
Cir. 990); United States v. Thornton, 901 F. 2d 738 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Pitts,
908 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569
(9thCir.1990); United States v. H-Iolland U.S. App. D.C. (1987). Some of these
concerns have been to some extent assuaged by the inclusion of liability for persons who
commit the proscribed activities within 100 feet of playgrounds and other enumerated
places where children may be present.
114. Lynn M. Paltrow, The War on Drugs and The War on Abortion: Some
Initial Thoughts on the Connections, Intersections, and The Effects, 28 S.U. L. Rev. 201,
223 (Fall 2001).
115. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17781.
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A variant of this argument had been previously seen in United
States v. Pitts,16 where the defendant contended that to apply 21 U.S.C.
Section 845a to him would violate the Equal Protection Clause because
the topography of Spokane, Washington was such that eighty percent of
the city was in a school zone. The court found that there was no
classification for purpose of equal protection analysis, stating there was
no "evidence of a public authority applying the statute with an unequal
hand that discriminates among persons in similar circumstances.
Without evidence of how section 845a(a) has been applied to persons, we
cannot find a classification." " 7  Moreover, the court discounted
defendant's claim that eighty percent of the city of Spokane was within
prohibited zones, indicating that he had improperly included some
locations in the calculation.' 18
A similar happenstance or fortuitous presence claim was raised in
United States v. Nieves.' 9 There, a defendant argued that the schoolyard
statute denied him equal protection of the laws because the statute's
enhanced penalties had a greater impact upon racial minorities who, he
argued, were more likely to live in high density inner city areas where
there are likely to be more schools than in other places. 20 The court,
however, rejected this argument, finding that even assuming there to be
some statistical validity to defendant's claim, this disparate impact alone
would not be the basis of an equal protection claim.' 2'
This argument was raised again in United States v. Crews, 22 where
a defendant lived across the street from a school was charged with
violation of the schoolyard statute. It was again rejected. It was yet
again tried in United States v. Agilar, where defendant argued "that the
statute has a disproportionate impact on members of racial minorities,
more of whom live, it is asserted, within 1,000 feet of schools than do
non-minority residents, a smaller proportion of whom live in densely
populated urban areas."'' 23 Calling this assertion a "strained theory,'
' 24
the court soundly rejected it.
The converse of such arguments regarding the location of schools
in dense urban areas was raised in State v. Moore, 25 where the defendant
was prosecuted under Utah's schoolyard statute for distributing drugs
within 1,000 feet of a middle school. The defendant argued that the
statute violated equal protection because it treats drug dealers in small
116. United States v. Pitts, 908 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1990).
117. Id. at 460
118. Id. n.4.
119. 608 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
120. Id. at 1150.
121. Id.
122. 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
123. Id. at 126.
124. Id.
125. 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
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towns differently than those in big cities. People living in small towns
are more likely to be within the prohibited zone.' 26  The court found,
contrary to defendant's claim, that this increased proximity did not make
him dissimilar to other persons in the state. The court argued that, after
all, the defendant could have distributed drugs elsewhere outside of the
zone.
127
Claims such as these are a variant of the fortuitous or happenstance
presence case in that the essence of the defendants' argument is that
given the circumstances of their residences and their racial backgrounds,
they are more frequently subject to schoolyard statutes. Courts have
been uniformly scornful of such claims, often because even if such
claims could be validated, defendants had not asserted any
discriminatory purpose. 28 Nonetheless, one wonders whether there may
yet be a court which might take seriously fortuitous presence claims, as it
becomes more clear that schoolyard statutes often grossly affect persons
of color and other distinct classes.' 29  The spaces which are
hypercriminalized by the application of schoolyard laws are often
isolated urban ghettos which house large numbers of the nation's poor
racial minorities. 130 Such neighborhoods are, hence, established black
126. Id. at 503.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Agilar, 779 F.2d at 126; Crews, 916 F.2d at 984; Nieves, 608
F.Supp. at 1150-51.
129. See, e.g., a series of Illinois laws which called for the adult prosecution of
juveniles who violated certain drug zone laws, beginning with the Illinois Safe Schools
Act of 1985, ILL. COMP. STAT. 702/7(6)(a) (West 1986) (repealed 1988); see also People
v. MA., 529 N.E.2d 492, 497 (111. 1988) (upholding the Safe School Act, which was
passed by the legislature in 1995) . In an ironic twist perhaps not clearly seen by Illinois
legislators, the Safe Schools Act, by mandating that 15-and 16-year-olds charged with
delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school be tried in adult court,
punished many of the same persons who were to be protected under school zone drug
laws. In 1987, the Illinois legislature incorporated these school drug zone provisions into
the Juvenile Courts Act, and in 1989 public housing projects were characterized by
statute as drug free zones. Some commentators have argued that these laws have had an
intensely disproportionate impact on black youth in Illinois. In 1992, the Chicago
chapter of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights brought suit challenging the youth
transfer law, asserting that, of the juveniles automatically transferred for drug crimes
within 1,000 feet of public housing in Illinois in 1992, all were African-American. In
1999, approximately 85% of the youth automatically transferred to adult court for drug
crimes in drug free zones were African-American. See Jason Ziedenberg, "Drugs and
Disparity: The Racial Impact of Illinois' Practice of Transferring Young Drug Offenders
to Adult Court: Building Blocks for Youth,"
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/illiiiois/illinois.html. See generally Thomas F.
Geraghty Will Rhee, Learning From Tragedy: Representing Children In Discretionary
Transfer Hearings, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 595 (1998).
130. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING Or THE UNDERCLASS 75-77
(1993)(asserting that 41% of all blacks live in urban areas and 35% of all blacks live in
the largest urban areas in highly segregated neighborhoods.)
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and brown "racialized spaces"' 31 where drugs and crime are viewed, if
not as the norm, then as expected hazards. This is contrasted with
racialization of space inhabited by whites. White areas are, according to
Alastair Bonnett, socially transparent, normative, neutral, banal, dull,
noncontroversial, normal, 32 and, I add, by implication, crime free, and
specifically drug free.
Such racialization of spaces resulted largely from housing
segregation. Though such segregation is no longer sanctioned by law, as
Professor Deborah Kenn has stated, "[i]t is now well-established and
indisputable that housing segregation as we know it today remains the
result of deliberate and systematic racist programs and policies of the
federal government, assisted in its institutional racism by the banking,
real estate, and insurance industries."'' 33 In circumstances where housing
patterns are often societally imposed, it is difficult to posit that equal
protection challenges to schoolyard statutes which punish persons living
within forbidden zones may be discounted because of the lack of
discriminatory intent. Indeed, one may well wonder if "discriminatory
intent" analysis yields ajust result in drug jurisprudence.'
34
VI. The Mens Rea Challenge to Schoolyard Statutes
A. Federal Schoolyard Statutes
131. I refer here to the notion that certain geographic areas "are carried and
placed on racial identity," in that they become closely associated with the characteristics
and norms of the inhabitants of that area. John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the
Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a Stone of Hope fron a Mountain of Despair, " 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 1233, 1271 (1995).
132. Alastair Bonnett, Geography, 'Race' and Whiteness: Invisible Traditions
and Current Challenges, 29 AREA 193, 199 (1997).
133. Deborah Kenn, Institutionalized, Legal Racism: Housing Segregation And
Beyond, I I B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 35, 39 (2001).
134. Such discussions have recently been raised with reference to the application
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), which provides for heightened penalties for the
possession of cocaine base (crack cocaine.) For example, in United States v. Clary, 846
F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), the trial court considered the
fact that possession of crack cocaine carried a penalty vastly higher than that imposed for
possession of powder cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(A)(ii)(l1). Because crack
cocaine was used far more often by blacks, the court found that they were frequently
subject to the harsher penalty without any clear rationale. The court alluded to
"unconscious racism" which could be seen as the source of the discriminatory purpose of
the statute. Thus, the court held that provisions which mandated such excessive
provisions for crack cocaine possession were invalid. Even given the ultimate reversal of
this decision, the impact of the trial court decision still resonates as a source for
furthering the discourse in this area. See generally Richard Dvorak, Cracking The Code:
"De-Coding" Colorblind Slurs During The Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5
MICH. J. RACE & L. 611 (2000); William Spade, Jr. Beyond The 100:1 Ratio: Towards A
Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 1233 (1996).
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Besides the constitutional challenges to the validity of the statute,
there have also been a number of challenges to the construction and
application of the schoolyard statute which falls into the fortuitous or
happenstance category. One of the more frequently made assertions has
been that the statute should not apply to persons who do not intend to
distribute drugs in proximity to schools or other statutorily relevant
localities. Essentially, this is another variant of the argument that mens
rea should be required for criminal liability, particularly where
conviction results in harsh penalties. In United States v. Falu, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit became the first court to interpret 21
U.S.C. Section 845a.35 Falu was clear in stating that the mens rea
requirement was provided by the underlying statute and that the
enhancement provision incorporated that underlying statute. Hence, to
interpret the enhancement provision without mens rea was not violative
of due process, as the enhancement did not criminalize behavior which
would otherwise be innocent.' 36 Accordingly, the court's analysis in
Falu does not take into account the idea that our typical Benthamian
system of assigning criminal penalties features heightened penalties as
the seriousness of the crime grows.' 37  In other circumstances,
seriousness of crime is intimately tied in with mens rea. Those crimes
committed without mens rea are often viewed as non-criminal accidents
or only criminal to only a minor degree. 138 Thus, the hypercriminalized
space of drug-free school zones would seem to be an exception to our
usual methods of penalizing criminal behavior.
Falu found that the purpose of the statute--deterrence of drug
distribution in and around schools-was clear from the legislative
history. Thus, a finding that a defendant must have knowledge that his
activity was within the prohibited area "would undercut this
unambiguous legislative design."'139 In Falu, the court seemingly had no
sympathy for the problem of fortuitous presence in school zones.
Participants in the drug trade run the risk that their activities would take
them into such areas:
Although we are aware that some schools are not clearly
recognizable as such from all points within the 1,000-foot
radius, Congress evidently intended that dealers and their
aiders and abettors bear the burden of ascertaining where
135. 776 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985).
136. Id.
137. Jeremy Bentham, "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation." See http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPMLI4.htinl (last visited
August 22, 2002)
138. Id.
139. Falu, 776 F.2d at 50.
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schools are located and removing their operations from those
areas or else face enhanced penalties.
140
This issue was taken up in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by
United States v. Pitts, where the defendant was convicted of possession
of cocaine with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school.141 Pitts
expressly followed the reasoning of Falu. In Pitts, the defendant argued
that Section 845a(a) violates the Due Process Clause in that it did not
require the prosecution to prove the mens rea element, that the accused
had actual knowledge of the proximity of a school. Thus, the defendant
urged, the statute failed to provide fair notice that such conduct is subject
to enhanced penalties. The court rejected this argument, and expressly
adopted the reasoning of Falu, indicating that the legislative history of
the statute showed Congress's unambiguous intent to deter drug
distribution in and around schools. Therefore, the absence of an express
mens rea requirement for the proximity of the offense was in keeping
with the purpose of the statute. In fact, requiring a mens rea element
would undercut that purpose. 42 Finally, the court noted that the statute
did not criminalize otherwise innocent activity because it incorporated
Section 841 (a)( 1).143  That statute required the mens rea element of
knowingly or intentionally distributing a controlled substance.
A number of other federal courts have reached this conclusion as
well. For example, in United States v. McDonald,44 the defendant was
convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under 21
U.S.C. Section 860. The court found that no proof need be adduced as to
whether the defendant intended to distribute in a school zone.145 The
purpose of the enhancement statute is "to give students increased
protection from the violence often accompanying serious drug offenses,
and from the threat of having their lives corrupted through proximity to
drug traffickers and their wares."
' 146
Some circuits, however, have found that application of the federal
schoolyard statute in certain circumstances involving fortuitous presence
in the zone was a misapplication of the statute. 47 Noteworthy is United
140. Id.
141. 908 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1990).
142. Pits, 908 F.2d at 461, citing Falu, 776 F.2d at 49-50.
143. Id.
144. 991 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
145. Id. at 868-71.
146. Id. at 869.
147. See also West, supra, at 1409. West also looks at several of these cases,
terming them "transient offender" cases. Her hypothesis is that when comparing the
cases of those charged with schoolyard violations where drugs are found in their
permanent residence were more likely to have the statute applied to their activities than
those who were "transient offenders," or were otherwise simply passing through the zone.
I consider more generally the notion of happenstance or fortuitous presence. My view of
20031
78 TEXAS FORUM ON Civil. LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS
States v. Liranzo in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 4 8 In
Liranzo, the court dismissed a schoolyard drug charge where the
defendant was arrested in a Port Authority bus terminal in Manhattan
while en route to Pennsylvania. The court looked to the fact that the
defendant was simply en route elsewhere, stating that "[b]ecause the
purpose of tile statute was to deter drug distribution in and around
schools, including transactions which took place near where students
gather, there is no policy reason to conclude that Congress sought to
punish those possessing a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a
school, but intending to distribute it elsewhere."'
149
Similarly, in United States v. Roberts, defendant Roberts and two
others were arrested at Penn Station in New York City and charged with
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute
cocaine under 21 U.S.C. Section 845a.' 5' Declining to find liability, the
Roberts court rejected a reading of the statute that would call for
schoolyard liability even where, for example, a car containing drugs were
passing through the zone.'' The court also explicitly rejected the
government's position that in drafting the schoolyard statute, "Congress
sought to erect a cordon sanitaire to bar dealers fiom even fleetingly or
accidentally passing within 1000 feet of a school.' 5 2  Indeed, the
Roberts court found the government's position quite unpersuasive:
Accordingly, states the government, the interpretation
rationally relates to the maintenance of this zone because
dealers who merely possess drugs that are intended to be
distributed elsewhere could be followed by someone
brandishing an "uzi" shooting wildly at innocent bystanders
or dealers may accidentally drop some of their "stash. "
Accepting these scenarios, a rational nexus between the
punishment provided and the government's interpretation
would exist only if one were to accept that the purpose of the
statute was the creation of an antiseptically "drug-free zone"
as opposed to the prevention of the supply of drugs to those
attending or who may gather near a school. 153
The court used language which makes clear that the court gave no
credence to a broad reading of the purpose of the school zone statute. In
such cases might take into account and explain, for example, United States v. Testa, infra,
in which the court found that a defendant who stored drugs in a "stash house" which
happened to be in a school zone would not be liable under the schoolyard enhancement.
148. 729 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
149. Id. at
150. 735 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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the court's view, the ills of passing through the zone with drugs are
comparable to the ills of passing through the zone with cigarettes. Such
a drug courier "does nothing to adulterate the zone with a supply of
drugs than a smoker having an unopened pack of cigarettes does to
adulterate a nonsmoker section or zone."154 Thus, the Roberts court
seems to reject the imposition of the hypercriminalized zone as it relates
to drugs in school zones.
The Second Circuit again rejected the hypercrininalization of
space founded upon fortuitous presence in United States v. Coates,'
5
defendants were at the gate of the Amtrak station in Penn Station in New
York City when they were observed by agents of the Drug Enforcement
Agency. When the departure of their train was announced, the
defendants boarded, and were followed by the agents. The agents
approached the defendants and asked them for identification. They also
searched the defendants' luggage. Inside one bag the agents discovered
narcotics. Because Penn Station was located within 1,000 feet of the
Taylor Business School, a nearby technical school, defendants were
charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or
more of cocaine and with possessing with intent to distribute 4,018
grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 812, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1) (B), and 845a(a). The court dismissed the
charge brought under the schoolyard statute, finding that defendants were
in the train station and thus within the school zone simply because that is
a departure point for trains. As the court noted, to impose schoolyard
liability in such circumstances "stretches the scope of the statute beyond
logical and acceptable bounds."1 56 The court further stated that the
defendants' presence was in the school zone was "undoubtedly
unknowing" and that to "posit liability under § 845a in these fortuitous
circumstances is simple overreaching. To hold otherwise would be to
mandate charging a schoolhouse count every time defendants on trains,
or any other means of transportation, speed by a school on their way to a
narcotics sale."' 
57
In United States v. Testa,158 the Northern District of Illinois
reached a result similar to that seen in the Southern District of New
York. In Testa, defendant maintained a house in a prohibited school
zone area which was expressly and solely for the purpose of storing
drugs. The Testa court relied on Liranzo, Coates and Roberts in finding
for defendants. Unlike those cases, however, Testa did not involve
merely passing through the zone. Some have thus suggested that Testa is
so factually dissimilar as to make it difficult to reconcile with the Second
154. Id.
155. 739 F. Supp. 146 (1990).
156. Idat 153.
157. Id.
158. 768 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. 111. 1991).
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Circuit cases. One might find greater parity, however, by focusing not
simply upon the defendant's happenstance presence, but rather upon the
happenstance presence of the drugs. The house where the drugs were
found was not primarily a residence; rather, it served as a "stash" house
where the drugs were kept before distribution to various points.
60
B. State Mens Rea Challenges
As at the federal level, challenges have been made in state cases to
the seeming absence of a mens rea requirement where school zone
penalties are imposed. In People v. Atlas, defendant appealed his
conviction for possession of a cocaine base for sale, within 1000 feet of a
school Linder Section 11353.6(b) of the California Health & Safety
Code. 16 1  The defendant contended that the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that the intent to sell
narcotics had to occur within 1,000 feet of a school in order for Section
11353.6(b) to apply. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that
Section 11353.6(b) did not have on its face a mens rea requirement that
required the state to prove that the defendant intended to sell narcotics
within 1,000 feet of a school. 162 The court held that the defendant bore
the burden of ascertaining where schools were located.
63
In making its findings, the court in Atlas considered a number of
cases that concern the matter of intent in schoolyard statutes, beginning
with an Indiana case, Williford v. Slate.164 In Williford, an Indiana court
held that a similar statute did not require the state to prove that the
defendant was knowingly or intentionally within the proscribed area at
the time he committed the drug offense. 165 The statute at issue there,
Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-10, provided that a person who
"knowingly or intentionally manufactures or delivers marijuana"
160. A stash house is a place, usually a residential unit or other innocuous place,
where drugs or proceeds from drug sales are stored until transit to another location. See,
e.g. United States v. Gallego, 247 F.3d 1191, 1195 (I Ith Cir. 2001); Greg Kekorian &
Jose Cardenas, FBI Arrests Twelve, Seizes Ten Tons of Pot, L A Times, Mar. 20, 2002,
at Part I1., P. I; 1-Louston Police online,
http://www.ci.houston.tx.us/departme/police/stash_house.htin; John J. Farmer, "Currency
Smuggling and Money Laundering in New Jersey,"
http://www.house.gov/tinancialservices/51500far.htm. Stash houses may be seen in
other contexts as well. For example, undocumented aliens are sometimes kept in stash
houses immediately after arriving in the United States, and are restrained there until they
are transported on to other locations. See e.g. Gregory Alan Gross, Thousands of Illegals
Smuggled on Buses, Feds Say, San Diego Union-Tribune, Dec. 12, 2001, at B2.
161. 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307 (Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
162. Id. at 309,
163. Id. at 312.
164. 571 N.E.2d 310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
165. Id. at 312-13.
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commits a Class A misdemeanor, but that the offense is a Class C felony
"if... the person delivered marijuana... in or on school property or
within one thousand (1000) feet of school property or on a school
bus.' 66 The defendant's request for an instruction stating that the statute
required that he acted knowingly or intentionally with regard to being
within 1,000 feet of school property was refused. 167 The trial court
instead used the prosecutor's proffered instruction, stating that the
prosecution was "not required to prove the defendant was knowingly or
intentionally within 1000 feet of school property at the time the
marijuana was delivered.' 68
The Williford court found that "the clear legislative intent was to
increase the severity of drug offenses occurring on or around school
property," and that the Indiana statute "resembles the federal 'schoolyard
statute,"' 21 U.S.C. § 845a, enacted in October 1984, which was
"[d]esigned to 'send a signal to drug dealers that we will not tolerate
their presence near our schools.""' 169 The court based its decision on the
Falu court's conclusion that the federal schoolyard statute had no mens
rea requirement."7
In a similar case, Commonwealth v. Murphy, a Pennsylvania court
held that an analogous statute did not require the prosecution to prove
that the defendant intended to be within 1,000 feet of a school when he
possessed controlled substances with intent to deliver.' 7' That statute,
204 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Section 303.9(c)(2), provided
for increased penalties when the court found that the defendant
"possesses with intent to deliver a controlled substance within 1000 feet
of a ... school. ,,172 The defendant claimed that his presence in the
prohibited area "was 'an accident, an [sic] happenstance, a
coincidence. ,,173 According to the court, the statutory language did not
"read 'possession, with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school,"'
and therefore did not require the government to prove the defendant
intended to be within 1,000 feet of a school.'74 Such a requirement
would defeat the purpose of the legislation, which was to "create a drug-
free zone around schools and to signal to drug traffickers that their
presence in this zone would subject them to longer sentences upon
conviction."' 
75
166. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-4- I 0(b)(2) (West 2002).
167. Williford, 571 N.E.2d at 531.
168. Id. at 310-1I.
169. United States v. Falit, 776 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1985).
170. Atlas, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529-30.
171. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 592 A.2d 750 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
172. 592 A.2d at 754.
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In State v. Ivory, a New Jersey court concluded that a similar
enhancement statute lacked an intent requirement. 76 In remarking upon
the fortuitous nature of the defendant's presence in the school zone, the
court observed, "[s]orne would argue that the statute was never intended
to apply to those like [the defendant] who happened to be riding his
bicycle through a safety zone. However, that is precisely what was
intended.' 77 The court clearly rejected the notion that a happenstance
presence while traveling through the zone would insulate the defendant
from schoolyard drug zone liability.
The Atlas court's conclusion, that Section 11353.6(b) should not
be read to include an intent requirement, is supported by another
California case, People v. Price.17 8  In Price, the court considered
whether an earlier version of the enhancement statute, Section 11370.4,
required that the prosecution prove that the defendant had actual
knowledge of the quantity or the intent to possess the specific quantity
involved.'" The Price court concluded that, once the defendant was
convicted of an enumerated underlying offense, no special intent or
knowledge was required under the enhancement statute, stating that "the
enhancement does not require specific intent. It merely provides when
the amount sold is more than a certain amount, an enhanced sentence
may result."'' 80  Price, in turn, relied on People v. DeLeon,18 1 which
upheld imposition of an excessive taking enhancement under Penal Code
Section 12022.6 in the absence of knowledge of the amount taken.
The trial court in Atlas relied on United States v. Pitts, and People
v. Meza, in refusing appellant's proposed instruction. Both Pitts and
Meza cited Falu for the proposition that
elimination of a mens rea requirement in the enhancement
statute under consideration did not violate due process
because the mens rea element was contained in the
underlying statute which was incorporated in the
enhancement provision.182
176. 124N.J. 582(1991).
177. Id. at 594.
178. 259 Cal. Rptr. 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
179. Section 11370.4 provided lbr a live-year enhancement when the defendant
was convicted of Sections 11351 or 11352 and the amount of contraband exceeded ten
pounds.
180. Id. at 1193-194; see also People v. Meza, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 844 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995) (imposing strict liability For weight enhancement regardless of knowledge of
quantity). In Meza, the court overruled Price to the extent that it "seems to require
clarification instructions" as to the scope of the defendant's knowledge or intent
regarding the quantity of contraband. Meza, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847-48.
181. 188 Cal. Rptr. 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
182. Atlas, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311.
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Appellant Atlas's argument was much like the argument made by the
defendant in People v. Price. 183 In Price, the defendant urged that the
weight enhancement required proof of knowledge or intent because,
under People v. Beeman,' 84 a conviction of the charged crimes as an
aider and abettor required the finding that he acted with the requisite
knowledge and intent. The court in Price, however, rejected this claim,
stating, "[n]o special intent or knowledge is required under the
[enhancement] statute or under Beeman."' 85 Similarly, neither Section
11353.6 nor Section 11351.5 requires a finding of intent to possess for
sale within 1,000 feet of a school in order for the enhancement to
apply.
186
Those cases which have evaluated the matter of required nens rea
would seem to have resolved this issue of fortuitous or happenstance
presence, suggesting for the most part that if in fact the statute seemingly
requires no particular intent to possess or sell drugs in the school zone,
this is in line with the legislative intent of such statutes. As the
defendant in State v. Brown187 argued, however, such statutes "if read
literally," allow
the conviction of persons who possess drugs which they
intend to distribute, not within 1,000 feet of a school, but
miles away as, for instance, the occupants of an airplane who
unwittingly fly 500 feet above school property, or the
occupants of a moving automobile who unknowingly pass
within 1,000 feet of a school bus on a highway or country
road. These situations, it is asserted, do not create potential
harm to school children and demonstrate that the statute is
too broad.1
88
The Brown court responded to this challenge by citing to cases that
support the proposition that statutes are generally overbroad if they reach
not only illegal conduct, but also constitutionally protected conduct. The
response of the court in Brown does not, however, get at the heart of the
matter. If schoolyard statutes, at either the state or the federal level, truly
intend that persons flying over drug free school zones in airplanes be
liable under such statutes, does this achieve the objective of drug
control? Is the objective any more likely to be reached when persons
stopped by police while walking or driving through school zones are
183. 259 Cal. Rptr. 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
184. 674 P.2d 1318 (Cal. 1984).
185. Price, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
186. Id.
187. 547 A.2d 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
188. Id. at 745.
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liable although police directed the individual into the school zone for the
stop?
189
These latter few questions have been raised in several cases,
among them Polk v. State, an Indiana case."o In Polk, defendant was a
passenger in a car stopped for a traffic violation in early morning hours
in a school zone. Drugs and drug paraphernalia were subsequently found
in the car and on his person. The defendant argued, among other things,
that given such facts, the statute should not be literally applied.,'91 He
also argued that if liability were found in his case, this would encourage
police to stop vehicles in school zones for the express purpose of penalty
enhancement. 192  The Polk court rejected both of these contentions,
stating first that in the only reported cases with facts similar to
defendants, those courts rejected such arguments. 193 As to the argument
that police would be encouraged to make "bad faith" stops, the court
responded that it is the place of the violation which was instrumental, not
the place of apprehension:
However, the enhancement is triggered by possession within
the zone, whether or not the defendant is pulled over within
the zone. It is the act of entering the zone, and not the police
action of pulling the defendant over, that triggers the
enhancement. Nothing forces drug offenders to drive within
the drug-free zone created by the legislature. To the
contrary, they pass there at their own peril and in jeopardy of
their own penal interests.
194
Moreover, in those cases where courts have considered the issue of
pretextual stops calculated to effect a search for drugs or to place
defendant in a prohibited zone, courts have been uniform in rejecting
such challenges.'95
189. Note that at least one court has held that when a defendant is first seen in a
school zone and flees from it, and immediately thereafter is apprehended with drugs in
his possession, a finder of fact is entitled to infer that the defendant possessed the drug in
the school zone. Anderson v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
190. Polk v. State, 683 N.E.2d 567 (Ind. 1997).
191. Id. at 570.
192. Id. at 571.
193. State v. Ogar, 551 A.2d 1037 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1989) (passenger
passing through zone apprehended For drug offense) State v. Brown, 547 A.2d 743 (N.J.
Super. Law Div. 1988) (driver apprehended).
194. Polk, 683 N.E.2d at 571-72.
195. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), where the defendant
was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently charged with violation of drug laws
after an officer observed narcotics in plain view. The Supreme Court affirmed the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals and rejected the appellant's argument that he
should not be subject to drug charges (among them a violation of the schoolyard statute)
because the stop was merely a pretext to stop the vehicle and search for drugs.
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In one instance, the District Court in United States v. Murdaugh
addressed the defendant's assertion that a charge brought under 21
U.S.C. § 845a should be dismissed because the government had tried to
enhance the penalties against him by intentionally stopping him in a
school zone. 196 Although the court suggested that one might imagine a
case "so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction," the
court concluded that this was not such a case. 197 There would have been,
the court noted, federal jurisdiction in this case even had the transaction
not taken place within 1,000 feet of a school. 198 Further, the site of the
sale was near the defendant's place of employment, and evidence showed
that it was the defendant rather than the government agent who chose the
location. 199 There was, finally, no evidence that the agent was aware
until after the fact that the location was within 1,000 feet of a school. °0
VII. Eighth Amendment Challenges
Like federal statutes, state schoolyard statues have also been
subjected to a wide variety of constitutional challenges. One interesting
challenge which has also been made in a reported case at the federal
level is the assertion that a state school zone statute violates a prohibition
against cruel and Unusual punishment because the penalty for offenses
under such statutes was disproportionate to those meted out for similar
crimes outside of school zone statutes. In State v. Burch, one defendant
was charged with selling, and another with purchasing cocaine within
1000 feet of a school. 20' Defendants faced a maximum sentence of thirty
years in prison if convicted.20 2 Because persons convicted of arguably
more serious crimes such as first degree murder and manslaughter had
the same sentencing exposure, the defendants argued that the potential
penalty under the school zone statute was so vastly disproportionate to
the act that the sentence was "shocking and outrageous."
20 3
Another challenge that has been raised is the assertion that a state
school zone statute violates a prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment because the penalty for offenses under such statutes was
disproportionate to those meted out for similar crimes outside of school
zone statutes. For example, in State v. Brown, the defendant argued that
the penalty was disproportionate to the offense and thus constituted cruel
196. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1354 (S.D. N.Y. 1989).




201. 545 So.2d 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
202. Id. at 284.
203. Id.
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and unusual punishment. 20 4 The court held, however, that a statute205
that provides that the possession of a controlled dangerous substance
with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of any school property or
school bus is a crime of the third degree and proscribing a mandatory
imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period, did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the federal and state
constitutions. 206 The court noted, however, that the purpose of the statute
was to reduce the availability of drugs for schoolchildren and to lessen
the exposure of schoolchildren to the criminal drug milieu, which were
rational findings and determinations that could not seriously be
questioned in this day and age.
VIII. Proximity to School Buses, Housing Projects, and tile Problem
of "Deperimeterizing"
Both federal law and several state laws contain provisions for
liability when certain drug activities occur in or near school buses or
public housing projects. While the legislative history of schoolyard
statutes focuses on the ills of drugs near schools, the frequently stated
rationales seem to weaken when school buses and housing projects are
considered. Indeed, the inclusion of both school buses and housing
projects as possible bases for "zone liability" seems to threaten to take
the zone out of the zone. Areas become completely deperimeterized in
ways only hinted at even in those cases which complained of the high
density of schools, and hence the higher likelihood of schoolyard
liability.
The concept of criminalizing or hypercriminalizing spaces by
necessity means creating areas or zones where certain crimes will not be
permitted, or where they will by punished to a greater degree. As seen
above, the general rationale for such zoning is that the safety and welfare
of the public is greatly enhanced. It appears, paradoxically, that while
criminalization of spaces seems to deter certain behaviors,
hypercriminalization of spaces does not deter behaviors to an increased
degree. This is very likely because of the fact that, as in the example of
schoolyard drug statutes, behaviors which are penalized are those which,
for a variety of reasons, are difficult for actors to lay aside. With the
inclusion of school buses and housing projects, the possibilities for
liability become so broad that for some individuals in certain
neighborhoods, it indeed becomes futile to hope to avoid heightened
penalties.
204. 547 A.2d 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
205. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C § 35-7 (West 2002).
206. Brown, 547 A.2d at 748.
207. Id.
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A. "Run, the bus is coming"-The Quintessential Moving Violation
One issue which has not been taken up either at the federal or state
level is the problems which may occur in those jurisdictions whose
schoolyard statute includes liability for persons whose vehicles come
into the zone of school buses when those vehicles have drugs inside.
208
This was raised in dicta in State v. Brown.20 9 Brown concerned the New
Jersey schoolyard statute, New Jersey Statutes Annotated 2C section 35-
7, which provides that the possession of a controlled dangerous
substance with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of any school
property or school bus is a crime of the third degree. The court
suggested that it could be the case that the statute would be deemed to go
too far in the case of, for example, liability for occupants of airplanes or
of automobiles which pass moving school buses. 211 Because neither of
these scenarios were present in Brown, the court left those problems to
212be addressed if and when they arose.
A somewhat related issue was seen in a Washington state case,
State v. Davis.2 13 In Davis, the defendant appealed convictions for drug
and weapons possession. 214 He was charged with making drug sales
within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop.215 The defendant argued that
sentence enhancement under the Washington statute violated due process
because there was no way of knowing that the stop had been designated a
bus stop.216 The stop in question was a municipal bus stop which had, in
this instance, been designated a school bus stop.2 7 The buses which
served the children at the stop were public buses and not standard yellow
school buses.2t8  The court in Davis rejected the argument of the
defendant, citing a similar case, State v. Coria.219 In Coria, the court
upheld the sentencing enhancement against constitutional challenge,
holding that the location of school bus stops can be learned by
"observing the gathering of schoolchildren waiting for their school buses,
or contacting local schools or the director of transportation for the school
district.
220
208. See, e.g., New Jersey and Indiana.
209. 547 A.2d 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
210. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C § 35-7 (West 2002).
211. Brown., 547 A.2d at 747.
212. Id.
213. State v. Davis, 970 P.2d 336 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).





219. 839 P.2d 890 (Wash. 1992).
220. Id. at 897.
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Although the school bus stop cases may suggest the outcome of
school zone cases based upon presence in or near a school bus, the two
cases are not completely apposite. There is, for one, the essential
difference that a school bus is mobile, and thus presumably takes the
zone with it wherever it goes. This, indeed, may give a whole new
meaning to the phrase "run, the bus is coming." One could not so easily
make the argument, as seen in Coria, that it is somehow possible to gain
notice of the precise route of the bus, given the possibility of variations
in travel. It may well be then that school bus cases would fall within that
set of "extreme" cases of happenstance or fortuitous presence-where
the interests ofjustice would require that there be no liability.
B. Liability for Drugs in Housing Project Zones
In Davis v. State, the appellant was convicted on two counts of
unlawfully distributing a controlled substance, violations of Code of
Alabama section 13A-12-21 1, and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment
for each conviction.22t In addition, each conviction was enhanced ten
years pursuant to sections 13A- 12-250 and 13A- 12-270 because the sales
took place within 3 miles of a school and within three miles of a housing
project.222 In that case, appellant did not contest his sentencing on both
schoolyard and "housing project" drug zone laws, but rather contested
other aspects of his sentence and the proceedings below.223 This is
doubtless because there were in fact two separate statutes which created
the zones, unlike the case with the federal school yard statute and the
schoolyard statute of other states. Nonetheless, the appellant in Davis
received the "double whammy," which results when the locale of drug
activity falls into two forbidden zones. Given the presence of both
schools and public housing projects in certain areas, it becomes difficult
indeed to avoid liability. Of course, such challenges may be met with the
same response to those raised in other due process equal protection cases
that complained of density.224 If, in fact, the intent of such statutes is to
protect families in residential areas, why then would not all residential
areas be deemed drug free zones?
IX. Conclusion-The Moving Violation and "Zoning" as a Method
of Crime Control
Although there is a long history of adherence to the "crime zoning"
method of crime control, as is seen in both the cases of drug free school
221. 673 So. 2d 845 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
222. Id. at 846.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Nieves, 608 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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zones and gun free school zones, it is ,not clear that such methods offer
little more than psychic relief to the drug problem. It would appear that
there are at least some cases of the "moving violation variety" where
justice and fairness demand that defendants not be convicted. The
problem for courts is that the existence of such cases threatens to
undermine much of the jurisprudence in school zone cases if any doubts
arise as to the fairness of applying such statutes. It seems clear that, just
as there is no clear correlation between incarceration for drug crimes and
the reduction of drug use in general, there is no correlation between
heightened incarceration for drug activity in school zones and reduced
use of drugs by juveniles. The hypercriminalization of space may well
have to give way to a new model.

